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Democritus University of Thrace, Greece 
 
The European continent has for some years been facing increased pressure from migration. In 2010, 
Europe, in comparison with the other continents, was expected to host the largest number of 
migrants: 69.8 million migrants representing 32.6 percent of the total flow of migrants (213.9 million 
international migrants). This pressure has caused the two main European organizations, the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, to act decisively for the protection of migrants. Although the 
European legal order offers a high standard of human rights protection—having adopted, over the 
decades, the relevant instruments and developed effective mechanisms—the two European 
organizations have used and continue use all legal tools, such as resolutions and recommendations, 
provided by their internal order.  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Migration Management, Border Control, and Human Rights   
The right to freedom of movement is guaranteed under Article 2, Protocol no. 4 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states in its second paragraph that 
“everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” In addition, Article 18.4 of 
the European Social Charter guarantees the right of nationals to leave their own country in 
order “to engage in a gainful occupation in the territories of the other Parties.” Nevertheless, 
as a general principle, the ECHR (like the European Social Charter) does not guarantee the 
right of an alien to enter and remain in the territory of a member state, nor does it guarantee 
the right to asylum.  
In exercising control of their borders, however, European states must act in conformity 
with ECHR standards. In East African Asians v. the United Kingdom, the European 
Commission on Human Rights held that racial discrimination in immigration control is 
incompatible with the ECHR.1 It found that the United Kingdom had exceeded its right and 
violated the ECHR by subjecting the residents of colonies of East Africa, who were of Asian 
origin, to immigration control while they were already citizens of the United Kingdom. The 
European Commission on Human Rights found that this differential treatment of a group of 
persons on the basis of “race” fell short of the principle of human dignity and constituted 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. This approach has been confirmed by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the interstate case Cyprus v. Turkey.2 
Moreover, in certain categories of cases, member states may be required by the ECHR to 
permit a migrant to enter or to remain: where a migrant meets the criteria requiring protection 
of his or her life (Article 2 ECHR) or of his or her physical integrity (Article 3 ECHR);3 or 
where deportation or extradition of an alien who has strong family ties in the country 
concerned could violate the right to respect for his or her family life (Article 8 ECHR).4 
The obligation states have to protect all human beings within their jurisdiction against 
violations of their rights by third parties or agents of the state includes the entry process and 
reception of aliens. Thus, states must ensure that non-nationals will not be arbitrarily  
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deprived of their life (Article 2 ECHR) or be subject to physical or mental ill-treatment 
amounting to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3 ECHR). 
Accordingly, aliens in the entry process should be protected against excessive physical 
restraint or inappropriate and unnecessary body searches.5  
Further, when aliens are held in reception centers and deprived of their liberty for 
immigration control purposes, they should be guaranteed adequate conditions and access to 
health and adequate food. They also have the right to be protected against discrimination, and 
this right is applicable at all times, including during entry and reception of migrants. 
The ECtHR has held, however, that Article 6.1 of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial) 
does not apply to proceedings regulating a person’s citizenship or the entry, stay, and 
deportation of aliens, because such proceedings do not involve the “determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him” within the meaning of this 
article.6  
Besides the obvious right to nondiscrimination, the organs of the Council of Europe have 
recognized a series of procedural measures to protect asylum seekers in order to ensure that 
the proceedings are fair and that the examination is objective and carried out individually. 
The purpose of such safeguards is to prevent violation of the right to nonrefoulement. Hence, 
in Human Rights Protection in the Context of Accelerated Asylum Procedures, the 
Committee of Ministers lists substantive rights and procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring 
the respect of these standards in so-called fast-track procedures.7 For instance, the guidelines 
provide for the right to information concerning the procedural steps to be taken in a language 
the asylum seeker understands but also for the right to legal advice and the right to have 
interviews carried out by qualified staff (Guidelines IV, VIII, and IX). 
The ECtHR has also found that to protect asylum seekers against arbitrary removals and 
ensure that their applications are given serious examination, they should be provided with 
sufficient information about their entitlements and the procedures to be followed in a 
language they understand, and they should have access to a reliable communication system 
with the authorities. When necessary, they should be provided with interpreters during the 
interviews, which should be conducted by trained staff and with legal aid. Further, the 
ECtHR has warned against excessively long proceedings and delays in communication of the 
decision. Finally, asylum seekers have a right to an effective remedy and should be given an 
opportunity to challenge the decision. To this end, they should be given the reasons for the 
decision.8 
 
Extradition/Expulsion of Migrants in Conformity with Human Rights 
Standards 
Article 1, Protocol no. 7 of the ECHR provides several safeguards relating to the expulsion of 
aliens. According to its explanatory report, the term “expulsion” comprises all forms of 
involuntary transfer of an individual from a territory. 
 
The concept of expulsion is used in a generic sense as meaning any measure 
compelling the departure of an alien from the territory but does not include 
extradition. Expulsion in this sense is an autonomous concept which is 
independent of any definition contained in domestic legislation. Nevertheless, 
. . . it does not apply to the refoulement of aliens who have entered the 
territory unlawfully, unless their position has been subsequently regularised.9 
 
In Nolan and K. v. Russia, the ECtHR stated, also, that the concept of expulsion is 
autonomous and independent of the definitions provided by domestic legislation. The ECtHR 




explained that “[w]ith the exception of extradition, any measure compelling an alien’s 
departure from the territory where he was lawfully resident constitutes an ‘expulsion.’”10 
While the protection of substantive human rights of migrants in expulsion is universally 
established and consistent between international and regional human rights systems, there are 
significant differences in the procedural protection in expulsion guaranteed by the various 
human rights treaties. 
Along with procedural protection, a set of substantive rights has been established by 
international refugee law and by international standards on extradition to protect migrants 
potentially subject to expulsion. These rights interfere with the principle of territorial 
sovereignty because they limit states’ control over the entry of non-nationals into their 
territory and restrict their discretion regarding expulsions from their territory, where removal 
risks causing human rights violations.  
The substantive rights of migrants in expulsion derive essentially from the principle of 
nonrefoulement, enshrined in Article 33 of Geneva Convention relating to the International 
Status of Refugees (1951), which prohibits the expulsion or return of a refugee “where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.” It was first established in 1933 by the 
League of Nations’ Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees,11 and it is 
further expressly provided for under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, which 
prohibits the expulsion, return, or extradition of a person “where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”12 The principle of 
nonrefoulement is now recognized as a principle of customary international law binding on 
all states, tied to the obligation to recognize, ensure, and protect the human rights of all 
persons within their jurisdiction.13 It is an absolute principle that cannot be subject to 
derogation.14 
As mentioned, the principle of nonrefoulement is applicable to all forms of transfer, 
including extradition. Article 3 of the European Convention on Extradition and Article 5 of 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism assert the principle by excluding 
the granting of extradition where there are grounds to believe that the request was made for 
“the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality 
or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.” 
Pursuant to Article 33.1 of the Geneva Convention, the protection against refoulement 
covers migrants present in the territory and those at the border.15 It further applies to both 
refugees and asylum seekers, whether they are undergoing the determination process or are 
intending to.  
The risks to be considered are not limited to those residing in the country of origin or to 
non-national who have their habitual residence in the country of destination. The definition of 
those risks is much broader and extends to indirect refoulement. The protection is to be 
understood as taking into consideration the risks arising in any country where the migrant 
might be sent, including states themselves susceptible of transferring the individual to an 
unsafe country: “the principle of non-refoulement applies not only in respect of the country of 
origin but to any country where a person has reason to fear persecution.”16 
Like the procedural protection of migrants in expulsion proceedings, the principle of 
nonrefoulement is subject to restriction. Under Article 33.2 of the Geneva Convention, the 
state may have reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee “as a danger to security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Within the meaning of 
the convention, the danger has to concern the country of refuge and plausibly threaten either 
the security or the community of the state in question.  




The ECHR does not explicitly provide for the principle of nonrefoulement. But the 
ECtHR has recognized the principle through its jurisprudence, by deriving from Article 1 of 
the ECHR an implicit obligation of states parties to protect migrants against refoulement. It 
found that the obligation to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms”17 guaranteed by the ECHR, combined with the requirement that such rights be 
practical and effective, creates an obligation for states to abstain from deporting or extraditing 
non-nationals facing the risk of violation of their rights in the destination country.18 
According to the court, the principle of nonrefoulement aims at protecting “the 
fundamental values of democratic societies.” The contracting states’ obligation to respect and 
ensure ECHR rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails 
a commitment not to extradite, deport, expel, or otherwise remove a person from their 
territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, either in the 
country to which removal is to be directed or in any country to which the person may 
subsequently be removed. The relevant judicial and administrative authorities should be made 
aware of the need to ensure compliance with the ECHR obligations in such matters.19  
The ECtHR has further specified that the principle of nonrefoulement applies where the 
expulsion or return would create a real and personal risk for the non-national. This means that 
the consequences of the removal must be foreseeable and that the risk faced by the person 
claiming the protection should be taken into account. In Saadi v. Italy it states, “In order to 
determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the ECtHR must examine the foreseeable 
consequences of sending the applicant to the receiving country, bearing in mind the general 
situation there and his personal circumstances.”20 
Moreover, the court has emphasized that when the human right at stake is absolute (such 
as the prohibition of torture), the principle of nonrefoulement becomes absolute and is not 
subject to any exceptions, whether in law or in practice. This rule applies to all expulsions, 
regardless of considerations of national security or other strong public interests, economic 
pressures, or heightened influxes of migrants.21  
Finally, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that diplomatic assurances (written guaranties by 
the authorities of the destination state to the expelling state that the person to be sent will not 
be subject to torture or to other violations of human rights) are highly unlikely to be sufficient 
to allow a transfer to countries where there are reliable reports that the national authorities 
tolerate torture.22 
Regarding the assessment of the risk of human rights violation in cases of expulsion or 
return, the ECtHR has repeatedly agreed that the source of the risk did not necessarily have to 
be state agents and has applied the protection of the principle of nonrefoulement to threats of 
human rights violations by nonstate actors, such as family members or armed groups. That 
protection also applied when the state was incapable or unwilling to protect the person at 
risk.23  
As in international refugee law, the definition of risk within the meaning of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR requires that the consequences of the removal or return be real 
and that they personally concern the individual claiming the protection of nonrefoulement. 
The ECtHR has asserted that there must be substantial grounds for believing that the risk is 
real and present, and not merely suspicions.24  
As for the requirement of a personal risk, it presupposes that the non-national subject to 
the expulsion or return can demonstrate that he or she would be directly exposed to a 
violation of his or her human rights. The ECtHR has held, however, that the risk can be 
personal even when the person is not individually targeted but simply belongs to a group or is 
in a situation similar to that of  persons whose rights are violated in the destination country. 
The non-national invoking the principle of nonrefoulement will in that instance have to 




demonstrate that it is a general or widespread practice and that he or she would be identified 
as falling within the category subject to the abuses.25  
In exceptional cases, the ECtHR has even recognized the existence of a real risk entailing 
the application of the principle of nonrefoulement where the general climate of violence in 
the country of reception was such that the person subject to the transfer would necessarily be 
exposed to the violence.26 
Further, it should be noted that the Council of Europe has recognized that gender and 
sexual orientation may, for some countries, be sufficient grounds to require the protection of 
nonrefoulement. In the case N. v. Sweden,27 for instance, the court has found that women 
could be a group at risk, and that the expulsion of an Afghan woman to her country would 
violate the principle of nonrefoulement. 
In 2000, Europe was the world’s largest host region for migrants, with 56.1 million 
people, representing 32.1 percent of total arrivals (174.8 million international migrants). 
Since then, Europe has been facing increasing pressure from migration. 
This pressure has motivated the Council of Europe of forty-seven member states to act 
decisively for the protection of foreigners when they are seeking migration to Europe. 
Although the European legal order offers a high standard of human rights protection—having 
adopted, over the decades, the relevant instruments and developed effective mechanisms—
the Council of Europe has used and still uses all the legal tools, such as resolutions and 
recommendations, provided by its internal order. 
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